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SILENCING THE CALL TO ARMS: A SHIFT
AWAY FROM CYBER ATTACKS AS WARFARE
Ryan Patterson∗
Cyberspace has developed into an indispensable aspect of
modern society, but not without risk. Cyber attacks have increased in
frequency, with many states declaring cyber operations a priority in
what has been called the newest domain of warfare. But what rules
govern? The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to
Cyber Warfare suggests existent laws of war are sufficient to govern
cyber activities; however, the Tallinn Manual ignores fundamental
problems and unique differences between cyber attacks and kinetic
attacks. This Article argues that several crucial impediments frustrate
placing cyber attacks within the current umbra of warfare, chiefly the
problems of attribution, categorizing uses of force under the jus ad
bellum, and compliance with the armed-conflict principles of
distinction and proportionality and the law of neutrality. Consequently,
identifying a victim-state’s recourse becomes risky and problematic.
For the vast majority of cases, this Article proposes departing from the
warfare paradigm and suggests states pursue alternative remedial
approaches. By domestically prosecuting cybercrimes, seeking
reparations for violations of non-intervention, and enhancing national
cybersecurity, states can effectively mitigate cyber attacks without the
risks and obstacles associated with treating cyber attacks as warfare.

∗ J.D., May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. English, University of
California, Berkeley, May 2008. I sincerely thank Professor David Glazier for his guidance and
expertise, and my Developments Editor, Rosemarie Unite, for her excellent editorial support.
Most importantly, a special thank you to my wife, Debbie, for her constant love and
encouragement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that the United States is under attack. Not by aircraft,
tanks, or submarines, but by something altogether different. In just
hours, government websites are shut down. Access to banking, news,
and social media websites is disrupted. Cable television and mobile
communications experience blackouts in large swaths. E-commerce
grinds to a standstill. To say that such an attack would impart chaos
on American society would not be hyperbole, given the country’s
staggering reliance on the Internet.1 Nor is this reliance specific to
the United States; countries around the world have seen exponential
growth in Internet usage.2 With such widespread Internet reliance,
the development of malicious cyber tactics,3 network exploitation,
and critical system vulnerabilities was inevitable.
Over the past several years, many high-profile cyber attacks
have caught the world’s attention. In 2007, Estonia was the victim of
a three-week cyber attack that first shut down government websites,
and then spread to websites of newspapers, television stations,
schools, and banks, repeatedly rendering them inoperable for hours
and days at a time.4 The effects were noteworthy, since at that time
Estonia was considered the most wired country in Europe, with
nationwide wi-fi and a near paperless “e-government” that conducted
ninety percent of its bank and election services online.5 Similarly, the
country of Georgia suffered attacks in 2008 that triggered
1. As of June 30, 2012, about 245 million Americans use the Internet. Internet Usage,
Facebook Subscribers and Population Statistics for All the Americas World Region Countries
June 30, 2012, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats2.htm (last
visited Oct. 23, 2013). This figure represents a population penetration of seventy-eight and
one-tenth percent. Id.
2. Of the roughly seven billion people on the planet, 2.4 billion use the Internet. World
Internet Usage and Population Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstat
s.com/stats.htm (last visited, Oct. 23, 2013).
3. See David Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Rise Is Seen in Cyberattacks Targeting U.S.
Infrastructure, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/27/us/cyberattacks
-are-up-national-security-chief-says.html (reporting that “[t]he top American military official
responsible for defending the United States against cyberattacks said . . . there had been a 17-fold
increase in computer attacks on American infrastructure between 2009 and 2011, initiated by
criminal gangs, hackers and other nations.”).
4. Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information Operations, 11
LEWIS AND CLARK L. REV. 1023, 1024–25 (2007); Steven Lee Myers, Cyberattack on Estonia
Stirs Fear of ‘Virtual War’, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05
/18/world/europe/18iht-estonia.4.5774234.html?_r=0.
5. Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in
International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 192, 193–94 (2009).
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widespread Internet outages and forced many government websites
to blazon Russian nationalistic propaganda.6 In 2010, the Stuxnet
virus, collaboratively generated and executed by Israel and the
United States, temporarily shut down one-fifth of the centrifuges
used to purify uranium at Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility.7 And finally,
in 2013, a group of pro-Syrian government hackers known as the
Syrian Electronic Army defaced a United States Marines Corps
recruitment website with a letter urging marines to “concentrate on
the real reason every soldier joins their military, to defend their
homeland,” in response to the United States’ involvement in the
Syrian conflict.8
Such high-profile attacks have led many nations around the
world to realize the need for expanded cybersecurity and to develop
the capability to conduct offensive cyber operations of their own, in
what many believe has become the next frontier in modern warfare.9
President Obama declared cyber threats to be one of the most serious
threats to national security, public safety, and economic stability,10
spurring the 2009 commission of the United States Cyber Command

6. Marco Roscini, World Wide Warfare—Jus Ad Bellum and the Use of Cyber Force, 14
MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 85, 90 (2010); John Markoff, Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html.
7. See generally David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave Of Cyberattacks Against
Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama
-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-againstiran.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&&gwh
=355753CAC7448E51CB1B05A46ECE9BBC; Jonathan Fildes, Stuxnet Virus Targets and
Spread Revealed, BBC NEWS TECH. (Feb. 15, 2011, 1:51 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news
/technology-12465688 (describing the Stuxnet attack).
8. John Bacon, Pro-Syrian Group Hacks U.S. Marines Website, USA TODAY, Sept. 2,
2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/02/marines-hackers-syrian-electronic
-army/2755265/. Along with the propaganda effort, the Syrian Electronic Army assailed the New
York Times and the Washington Post with a rash of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.
Id.
9. See NILS MELZER, CYBERWARFARE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 2011, at 3 (2011),
available at http://unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/cyberwarfare-and-international-law-382.pdf
(stating “military reliance on computer systems and networks . . . open[ed] a ‘fifth’ domain of
war—fighting next to the traditionally recognized domains of land, sea, air and outer space”);
Roscini, supra note 6, at 97–98 (noting many nations now commission “uniformed hackers” in
their military, including China, Israel, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States);
Leslie Swanson, The Era of Cyber Warfare: Applying International Humanitarian Law to the
2008 Russian-Georgian Cyber Conflict, 32 LOYOLA L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 303, 305
(2010) (“As modern society increasingly relies on global and domestic information structures,
these structures tend to become targets during war and other hostilities.”).
10. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 27 (2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
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(USCYBERCOM), whose stated goal is to safeguard the integrity of
the U.S. military computer systems.11
If cyber attacks continue to be characterized with military
rhetoric as “cyberwarfare,” it raises the question of which legal rules
govern these activities. The answer will dictate a victim state’s
available remedies or responses under international law, and inform
state and non-state actors how to lawfully conduct cyber activities.
Ostensibly, a few choices exist: apply traditional law of war rules (as
developed through existing treaties and customary international law
(CIL)), develop new rules through an international treaty specific to
“cyberwarfare” activities, or adopt alternative frameworks beyond
the warfare paradigm.12
Many Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) scholars propose that
cyber attacks should be treated like advancements in conventional
kinetic weaponry and may therefore qualify as uses of force under
the law governing the use of armed force by states in international
relations (jus ad bellum).13 This means cyber attacks that met the
threshold definition of a use of force would be unlawful under the
U.N. Charter, which prohibits members from using or threatening to
use force in their international relations,14 and recognizes the
inherent right of self-defense against force that qualifies as an armed
attack.15 Scholars also contend that cyber attacks are subject to the
law governing the means and methods of warfare (jus in bello, or
LOAC),16 which requires that military hostilities follow such
foundational principles as distinction,17 proportionality,18 and the law
of neutrality during an armed conflict.19
11. Tod Leaven & Christopher Dodge, The United States Cyber Command: International
Restrictions vs. Manifest Destiny, 12 N.C.L.J. & TECH. ON. 1, 1–2 (2010).
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., MELZER, supra note 9; Catherine Lotrionte, Symposium: International Law
and the Internet: Adapting Legal Frameworks in Response to Online Warfare and Revolutions
Fueled by Social Media: State Sovereignty and Self-Defense in Cyberspace: A Normative
Framework for Balancing Legal Rights, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 825 (2012); Roscini, supra
note 6; Swanson, supra note 9.
14. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
15. Id. art. 51. See infra Part III for a full discussion on cyber attacks as potential uses of
force under the jus ad bellum.
16. MELZER, supra note 9, at 4.
17. Requiring that attackers “at all times distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives.” Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 48, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Additional Protocol I].
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At the invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence
Centre of Excellence, a group of international experts has gone
further and published the Tallinn Manual on the International Law
Applicable to Cyber Warfare,20 which is intended as a restatement
and manual similar to the San Remo Manual on International Law
Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea and the Manual on
International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare.21 The
Tallinn Manual analyzes cyber operations using existent jus ad
bellum and jus in bello rules, with mostly successful results.22
However, such extrapolation is not without problems. Several crucial
impediments present themselves, which frustrate placing cyber
attacks within the umbra of warfare—the greatest being the problem
of attribution.23 With the increasing participation of non-state actors
in attacks against states around the world, the bounds of the LOAC
have already become strained as experts debate whether, and how,
the traditional LOAC rules apply to such non-state actors.24 The
difficulty of determining identities in cyberspace, where civilian
hacker groups can conduct cyber attacks utilizing personal
computers, makes this inquiry all the more perplexing.25 Victim
states may find themselves unsure which state should be held

18. Requiring that inadvertent or incidental civilian casualties and damage (collateral
damage) not be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. Id. art. 51.
19. Obligating neutral states to prevent their territory from being used by belligerents in an
international armed conflict, and requiring belligerents to respect a neutral state’s territory as
inviolable by refraining from prohibited conduct in the neutral territory. Hague Convention (V)
Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, arts. 1,
5, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. See infra Part IV for a full
discussion on whether cyber attacks may comply with the jus in bello.
20. Int’l Grp. of Experts, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013), available at http://issuu.com/nato_ccd_coe/
docs/tallinnmanual?e=5903855/1802381 [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL].
21. Id. at 1. See PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT
HARVARD UNIV., MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE
WARFARE (2009), available at http://ihlresearch.org/amw/HPCR%20Manual.pdf; SAN REMO
MANUAL ON MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA
(Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995).
22. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20.
23. Id. at 1.
24. See Collin S. Allan, Attribution Issues in Cyberspace, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L.
55 (2013); Lotrionte, supra note 13, at 855. The U.N. Security Council has implied the LOAC
can in fact apply to non-state actors (authorizing the United States to use self-defense measures
against al-Qaeda under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter); however, the contours of such application
remain in debate. Lotrionte, supra note 13.
25. Allan, supra note 24, at 55.
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responsible, assuming the cyber attack is traceable at all.26 For
example, the route traveled by the 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia was
traced through Russia and several of its government institutions, but
also traversed 177 other countries along the way.27
While the Tallinn Manual has been successful in elucidating
how many traditional LOAC rules and principles apply to cyber
attacks, its failure to address some glaring incongruities necessitates
either supplementary international development or a departure from
the warfare model altogether. Current manifestations of cyber attacks
rarely achieve militaristic ends, but rather take the form of espionage,
crime, or political and economic coercion.28 This Article contends
that because the nature of a cyber attack often precludes proper legal
analysis under the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello, the effort of the
Tallinn Manual and other LOAC experts to summarily insert the
growing phenomenon into the war paradigm is premature. Instead,
this Article argues, alternative legal regimes should be used to
respond to cyber threats until international rules specific to cyber
attacks develop. Part II of this Article provides an overview of
relevant definitions and the unique setting of cyberspace.
Consequently, Part III evaluates how cyberspace’s principal
architecture may render attribution of cyber attacks to states
impractical. Part IV reviews the categorization of attacks as uses of
force under the jus ad bellum, and how cyber attacks generally fall
short of the definition. Part V examines the conduct of hostilities
under the jus in bello, exploring how cyber attacks may comply with
the principles of distinction, proportionality, and obligations under
the law of neutrality. Finally, Part VI analyzes how alternate legal
regimes, including domestic law enforcement and the international
principle of non-interference, may prove more effective frameworks
to govern malicious cyber activities.
II. DEFINING “CYBERWARFARE” AND ITS UNIQUE NATURE
To properly discuss the legal ramifications of international cyber
attacks against states, working definitions of pertinent terms are
26. Id.
27. Id. While the legal countermeasures available to Estonia at the time remain unclear, the
complicated route the cyber attacks followed clearly illustrates the attribution quagmire. Michael
Gervais, Cyber Attacks and the Laws of War, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 525, 530 (2012).
28. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 4.
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warranted. The term “cyberspace” is used to describe the “space of
virtual reality; the notional environment within which electronic
communication (especially via the Internet) occurs.”29 Cyberspace
encompasses email, the Internet, file transferring, as well as other
programs that connect computer users.30 Terminology specific to
cyber activities has been developed to assist in categorizing the
breadth of possible operations.31 At the broadest level, any
“reduction of information to electronic format” and its passage
“between physical elements of cyber infrastructure” constitutes a
“computer network operation” (CNO).32 In the context of malicious
cyber activities, CNOs can then be subdivided into three
categorizations: (1) computer network attack (CNA),33 (2) computer
network exploitation (CNE),34 or (3) computer network defense
(CND).35 CNEs are efforts “focused on intelligence collection and
observation rather than on network disruption,”36 and are presumed
lawful under international law, which does not prohibit espionage.37
CNAs and CNDs, on the other hand, “aim at altering or destroying
the information contained in the targeted computer or computer
network with the purpose of incapacitating . . . and/or of causing
damage extrinsic to the targeted computer/network.”38 This Article
discusses only CNAs and CNDs that potentially rise to the level of a
use of force under jus ad bellum or are employed in an armed

29. Cyberspace, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry
/240849?redirectedFrom=cyberspace& (last visited Dec. 16, 2013).
30. Gervais, supra note 27.
31. See generally MELZER, supra note 9, at 5 (summarizing categories of cyber operations).
32. Id.
33. Any cyber operation “aiming to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident
in computers and computer networks, or to the computers and networks themselves.” Id. (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
34. Any cyber operation “enabling . . . intelligence collection to gather data from target or
adversary automated information systems or networks.” Id. (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
35. Any cyber operation “taken to protect, monitor, analyse, detect, and respond to
unauthorized activity within . . . information systems and computer networks.” Id. (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
36. Roscini, supra note 6, at 92. Examples of CNEs include stealing sensitive information
such as IDs and passwords from computers through the use of “trap doors” (that allow external
users to unknowingly access computer software) and “sniffers” (remote programs that intercept
data transmitted over a network). Id. at 93.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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conflict subject to the jus in bello.39 The most prevalent forms of
CNAs and CNDs are hardware and software corruption through the
use of viruses and worms,40 or distributed denial of service
(DDoS).41
The U.S. Army’s Cyber Operations and Cyber Terrorism
Handbook defines a cyber attack as “[t]he premeditated use of
disruptive activities, or the threat thereof, against computers and/or
networks, with the intention to cause harm or to further social,
ideological, religious, political or similar objectives . . . [o]r to
intimidate any person in furtherance of such objectives.”42 However,
that definition is very broad, exceeding the bounds of what the
LOAC considers to be an attack.43 A narrower definition would
proscribe “efforts to alter, disrupt, or destroy computer systems or
networks or the information or programs on them.”44 Yet these
common definitions fail to demonstrate the essential notion of what
constitutes an attack—an act of violence.45 The Tallinn Manual,
commensurate with LOAC definitions, defines a cyber attack as a
“cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonably
expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction

39. Included are CNAs and CNDs deployed either by military combatants targeting a state,
or non-state actors whose conduct is attributable to a state. The CNO designations are not
exclusively military terms and may encompass otherwise private activities that do not implicate
international law. Id.
40. Id. Viruses and worms are self-replicating programs that “can be installed . . . through
chipping, hacking, or by simply e-mailing them.” Id. A virus “attaches itself to a legitimate
program on the target computer” and alters its function, other programs’ functions, as well as the
programs of computers connected to the host computer via a network. Id. A worm does not alter
resident programs, but “captures the addresses of . . . target computer[s] and resends messages
throughout the system so to cause a general slowdown and potentially a crash.” Id.
41. A DDoS attack is accomplished when many computers simultaneously inundate a target
network with large volumes of requests, rendering the network incapacitated. Id. A common
cyber attack tactic, several notorious DDoS attacks have been conducted in the past several years,
such as the coordinated website takedowns of Bank of America, Citibank, Wells Fargo, and JP
Morgan Chase in 2012. Ellen Nakashima & Danielle Douglas, More Companies Reporting
Cybersecurity Incidents, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world
/national-security/more-companies-reporting-cybersecurity-incidents/2013/03/01/f7f7cb68-8293
-11e2-8074-b26a871b165a_story.html.
42. U.S. ARMY TRAINING & DOCTRINE COMMAND, DCSINT HANDBOOK NO. 1.02,
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE THREATS AND TERRORISM, at VII-2 (2006).
43. See infra Part III.
44. Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article
2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421, 422 (2011).
45. An “attack” is an “act[] of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or
defence.” Additional Protocol I, supra note 17, art. 49.

978

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:969

of objects.”46 In addition, the Tallinn Manual explains that “acts of
violence” are not strictly confined to kinetic force, but that CIL
recognizes many non-kinetic effects that can constitute attacks.47 It is
typically the consequences of an action, not its nature, that determine
whether it is an attack; thus non-violent operations may be
encompassed should their consequences prove destructive.48
Furthermore, a cyber operation need not directly result in death,
injury, or damage to qualify as an attack; indirectly damaging
consequences would suffice.49 Indeed, it would be an absurd
technicality to exclude a cyber operation that indirectly leads to
widespread death and destruction from being labeled an attack,
where a kinetic attack that directly leads to the same result would be
sufficient.50
Thus, for the purposes of this Article, cyber attacks are
considered the “hostile use of cyber force” consistent with
weaponized CNAs and CNDs meant to incapacitate, degrade,
damage, or destroy a computer, computer network, website, data
resident therein, or cause extrinsic damage to the target computer or
network.51
However one formulates the definition of a cyber attack, it is
essential to recognize the medium’s technological nature.
Fundamental to properly evaluating cyber attacks as warfare is a
basic understanding of how information is transmitted via the
Internet. Digital transmissions through cyberspace can be
far-reaching and span the globe near instantaneously, with the tools
required being widely available and relatively easy and cheap to
acquire.52 The Internet itself is not a physical structure, but a
46. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 106.
47. For example, chemical, biological, or radiological attacks usually do not have kinetic
effects, but are universally agreed as constituting “attacks” under the LOAC. Id.
48. Article 51 of Additional Protocol I expressly characterizes attacks as causing “loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof.” Additional
Protocol I, supra note 17, art. 51. By emphasizing the consequences of an attack without
expressly delineating the form of an attack, it is suggested that the LOAC sought to encompass
many different means that could result in destructive ends.
49. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 107.
50. See id.
51. Roscini, supra note 6, at 96.
52. Id. at 87–88; see also MELZER, supra note 9, at 5 (“Cyberspace not being subject to
geopolitical or natural boundaries, information and electronic payloads are deployed
instantaneously between any point of origin and any destination connected through the
electromagnetic spectrum.”).
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“network of networks,” or inter-network, and communication links
following specific rules, or protocols, that allow computers and
computer networks to exchange information.53 The public Internet is
just one of many thousands of inter-networks, which include many
private inter-networks utilized by businesses and governments to
connect remote locations.54
To communicate with one another, millions of individual host
computers and computer networks utilize the Transmission Control
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) to send and receive data.55
Before being transmitted over the Internet, a host computer breaks up
a data message, such as an email or video file, into many small
packets, which are then independently routed to a recipient
machine.56 Through such “packet switching,” each individual data
fragment travels from the host computer to any number of other
interconnected computers, networks, and routers composing the
Internet until all of the packets reach their destination, often out of
order, where the recipient machine reconstitutes the packets back
into a single message.57 The routes of individual packets are wholly
unpredictable, with each packet potentially taking any one of a
nearly innumerable array of alternate paths between routers around
the world.58 In this way, the Internet is decentralized, with no central
server managing the traffic, nor any single entity wielding control or
state wielding jurisdiction over all information conveyed.59 By
adopting the TCP/IP protocol for formatting, addressing,
transmitting, routing, and receiving information packets, the Internet
is a “survivable” network where each connected computer takes part
in the transmission of information.60 Unlike a system with a single
master routing process, cyberspace can continue to function even if
individual machines connected to it become damaged or
incapacitated.61

53. PATRICIA L. BELLIA ET AL., CYBERLAW PROBLEMS OF POLICY AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
THE INFORMATION AGE 17 (4th ed. 2011).
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 18–19; see also MELZER, supra note 9, at 5.
See BELLIA ET AL., supra note 53, at 18.
Id. at 17; Gervais, supra note 27, at 529.
See BELLIA ET AL., supra note 53, at 18.
Id.
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In contrast to traditional domains of warfare, cyberspace itself is
the only entirely man-made domain.62 As a result, it is maintained
and operated by private and public entities, and can change in
character very rapidly due to advancements in technology.63 Among
other technological attributes, the rapid pace at which cyberspace is
expanding and cyber operations become more sophisticated has
made the application of the LOAC difficult and unwieldy.64
III. THE PROBLEM OF ATTRIBUTION
Though cyberspace is theoretically accessible to all, tracing
information transmitted through it can be particularly difficult.65
Tactics such as IP spoofing66 and the use of botnets67 allow users to
hide or counterfeit the true origin of an operation, making
identification of perpetrators and attribution to states unreliable.68
Two layers of anonymity must then be unraveled: (1) determining
the identity of the individual operator of the cyber attack, and (2)
determining whether the operator is a state actor (for example, a
member of the military) or non-state actor whose conduct is
attributable to the state.69 In situations where the cyber attack clearly
emanated from a state actor, attribution is simple; however, most
cyber attacks tend to be conducted by individual non-state actors,
which renders attribution extremely difficult.70
When the origin of an unlawful cyber attack has been traced to
non-state actors, a victim state would need to prove another state
exhibited sufficient control over the non-state actors before holding
that state responsible.71 However, the appropriate threshold of
control required is a point of contention.72 In traditional military
62. MELZER, supra note 9, at 5.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. IP spoofing is the creation of data packets with a forged source IP address, with the
purpose of concealing the identity of the sender or impersonating another computer system. Id. at
5 n.6.
67. A botnet is an interconnected series of compromised computers used for malicious
purposes. A computer becomes a bot when it runs a file that has bot software embedded in it. Id.
at 5 n.7.
68. Roscini, supra note 6, at 96.
69. See id.
70. See Lotrionte, supra note 13, at 855.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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contexts, two tests have been developed to determine whether actions
by private non-state actors can be attributed to a supporting state.73
The “effective control” and “overall control” tests are difficult to
apply in a CNA context, though, and represent too high of a bar to
effectively determine when a state may be responsible for the cyber
attacks of a non-state actor.74
In Nicaragua v. United States,75 the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) administered an “effective control” test to determine
that the actions of Nicaraguan rebels, including the killing,
wounding, and kidnapping of Nicaraguan citizens, could not be
attributed to the United States.76 Despite the United States’ supplying
the rebels with arms and helping to plan offenses, the ICJ found the
exhibited level of control insufficiently complete.77 Thus, the United
States could not be held accountable for the war crimes as a
belligerent.78 In its ruling, the ICJ set a very high standard for
holding a state responsible for the actions of non-state actors.79 “The
effective control test requires a state to essentially be in total control
of the non-state actors, and . . . specifically direct or enforce
violations of international law.”80 Despite recognizing that the
United States planned, collaborated, financed, trained, and supplied
at least one of the rebel groups, the court was unable to conclude that
rebels were acting on the United States' behalf because of the lack of
total control.81
Thirteen years after Nicaragua, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) decided Prosecutor v.
Tadić,82 in which it implemented an “overall control” test with a less
stringent threshold than the effective control test.83 In determining
whether to impute the acts of non-state actors to a state, the ICTY
decided it “must be proved that the State wields overall control . . .
73. Allan, supra note 24, at 60.
74. Id.
75. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 181 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua].
76. Allan, supra note 24, at 65–66.
77. Id. at 66.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 67.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
83. Lotrionte, supra note 13, at 855–56.
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by equipping and financing . . . [and] by coordinating or helping in
the general planning of [the] military activity,” but concluded that
the state did not necessarily have to give “instructions for the
commission of specific acts contrary to international law.”84 The
ICTY also qualified the test by highlighting the importance of
location, requiring additional evidence of genuine control over
direction and planning if the unlawful acts are committed in the
territory of a state other than the controlling state.85 The court also
required a higher level of control for non-militarily organized groups
than for militarily organized groups, necessitating that the former be
given specific instructions by the state that lead to unlawful acts, or
that the state endorse such acts after the fact.86 In contrast to the
effective control test, the overall control test is a more lenient
standard that, in some circumstances, does not require that a state
exhibit complete control over every action by the non-state actors.87
Rather, the overall control test generally requires that a state finance,
equip, and generally plan military activities of non-state actors before
subsequent unlawful actions can be attributed to the state.88
In the context of a cyber attack, however, attempting to apply
either test to prove attribution of state responsibility will likely fail.
For example, the 2008 cyber attacks on Georgia are presumed to be
the work of organized crime groups working on the Russian
government’s behalf; nonetheless, under either test it would be
impossible to legally attribute the actions to Russia.89 First, no
evidence has been found connecting Russia and the organized crime
groups, or the hackers employed.90 Second, limited facts exist
demonstrating the Russian government exhibited any control over
the botnets used to attack websites.91 Although Russia engaged in
traditional military operations contemporaneous to the cyber attacks,
that corroborative evidence alone is insufficient to establish
attribution.92 Under the effective control test, there is woefully
84. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 131 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
85. Allan, supra note 24, at 69.
86. Id. at 70.
87. See Lotrionte, supra note 13, at 855–56.
88. Tadić, Judgment, ¶ 131.
89. Allan, supra note 24, at 57.
90. Id. at 75.
91. Id.
92. See id.
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insufficient evidence that the Russian government exhibited the
requisite degree of control over the cyber attacks. Application of the
overall control test leads to a similar result.93 Even under this
less-stringent test, the tenuous connection between the Russian
government and the organized crime groups impedes attribution
because insufficient evidence exists to establish that Russia
equipped, financed, or helped plan the cyber attacks, or that it
endorsed them after the fact.94 Considering the hackers who carried
out the attacks at the organized crime groups’ direction likely used
their own equipment, Internet connections, and malware, searching
for links to the Russian government appears futile.
Besides, scholars disagree whether either Nicaragua or Tadić
are internationally controlling, which makes their application to
cyber attack conflicts even more dubious.95 The Tallinn Manual
glosses over the attribution problem, merely noting the Nicaragua
and Tadić tests without prescribing anything to mitigate the obstacles
associated with applying the tests to cyber attacks.96 Failing to
address anonymity in cyberspace and the prevalent lack of evidence
of state control quickly renders further analysis of cyber attacks
under the jus ad bellum or jus in bello unproductive.
Ultimately, there will likely be frequent uncertainty whether a
victim-state of a cyber attack is targeting the correct state for
counter-measures. To avoid committing their own violations of
international law, a victim-state may therefore allow non-attributable
cyber attacks perpetrated at the direction of states to go unchecked
and unpunished. Plus, the low cost of cyber attacks, the ease with
which they can be carried out, and the fact that cyber attacks can be
forged to appear to originate from an unrelated country frustrate the
existing attribution regime to the point of potentially precluding
further analysis under the jus ad bellum or jus in bello.

93. Id. at 76.
94. Id.
95. See Lotrionte, supra note 13, at 856 (noting that “after 9/11, international law held
Afghanistan accountable because it failed to uphold its duties to prevent al Qaeda from harming
other states from its territory . . . [and] . . . liable for terrorists attacks carried out by a non-state
actor that no one argued was an agent of Afghanistan”).
96. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 32 and n.48. (preferring the effective control test
under the commentary to Rule 6).
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IV. WHETHER CYBER ATTACKS CAN RISE TO
THE LEVEL OF A USE OF FORCE OR ARMED
ATTACK UNDER THE JUS AD BELLUM
Assuming attribution is not a problem, then determining whether
a cyber attack is unlawful requires an understanding of how force is
defined in international law, and if a cyber attack is capable of
reaching the threshold level to meet that definition.97 U.N. Charter
Article 2(4) prohibits member states from engaging in “the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.”98 While Article 2(4) does not expressly define
“force,” a reading of the U.N. Charter makes clear that “at either end
of the spectrum, it is apparent what is force and what is not force.”99
On one end, traditional military force using conventional military
weapons clearly constitutes a use of force.100 On the other end,
political or economic coercion does not constitute a use of force,101
as the purpose of the United Nations and the U.N. Charter “is to
maintain international peace and security” and “to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war.”102 By excluding economic and
political coercion from the definition of force, the drafters indicated
that uses of force in violation of Article 2(4) focus strictly on military
instruments.103 The boundary between a use of force and a non-use
of force therefore lies within the area between an exercise of
traditional military coercion and an exercise of political or economic
coercion.104 Although the U.N. Charter is binding only on member
states, the prohibition against the threat or use of force has been
accepted as customary international law and binds all states
regardless of U.N. membership.105

97. See Gervais, supra note 27, at 535–36.
98. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
99. Reese Nguyen, Navigating Jus Ad Bellum in the Age of Cyber Warfare, 101 CALIF. L.
REV. 1079, 1113 (2013) (emphasis omitted).
100. See id. at 1113–14 (noting that under the U.N. Charter “force” encompasses “armed
force” and the “use of conventional military weapons”).
101. Id. at 1114. “State practice supports these understandings: the United States, among
other nations, has used forms of economic and political coercion since the early days of the
Charter largely without legal challenge.” Id.
102. Gervais, supra note 27, at 536.
103. Id. at 537.
104. Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1114.
105. Id. at 1112–13.
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The ICJ has stated that U.N. Charter Articles 2(4) and 51, which
recognizes the inherent right of self-defense against armed attacks,106
apply to “any use of force, regardless of the weapons employed.”107
Although non-binding, ICJ advisory opinions are persuasive legal
authority108 in the international community and suggest the jus ad
bellum encompasses all forms of force, including tactics used in
cyberspace.109 Accordingly, the United States takes the position that
during peacetime, a cyber attack may qualify as a use of force.110
The drafters of the U.N. Charter deliberately excluded economic
coercion from the definition of force in Article 2(4), focusing instead
on military instruments.111 The U.N. Charter’s travaux préparatoires
and the drafting histories of subsequent U.N. resolutions also
indicate that traditional military coercion is the quintessential
example of force.112 However, the Charter does not explicitly define
this distinction, which is further obfuscated by another necessary
differentiation between a use of force and an armed attack.113 An
armed attack is a use of force so egregious that the victim would be
justified in responding with force in self-defense.114 A state may
lawfully resort to self-defense only when a use of force reaches this
level, which is consistent with the ICJ’s stance115 that “there is a
substantive distinction between the ‘use of force’ and an ‘armed
attack.’”116 Conventional notions suggest that “even small-scale
bombings, artillery, naval or aerial attacks qualify as ‘armed attacks’
activating Article 51, as long as they result in, or are capable of
106. U.N. Charter art. 51.
107. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
244, ¶ 39 (July 8).
108. Advisory Jurisdiction, INT’L CT. JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1
=5&p2=2 (last visited Oct. 23, 2013).
109. See Lotrionte, supra note 13, at 854 (“A cyber operation that constitutes a use of force
under Article 2(4) is an internationally wrongful act.”).
110. See THE WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE 9 (2011) (“The
development of norms for state conduct in cyberspace does not require a reinvention of
customary international law, nor does it render existing international norms obsolete.
Long-standing international norms guiding State behavior—in times of peace and conflict—also
apply in cyberspace.”).
111. See Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1114.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1115.
114. See Shackelford, supra note 5, at 230–31.
115. Nicaragua, supra note 75, ¶ 195 (indicating that the difference between a use of force
and an armed attack is one of “scale and effects”).
116. Gervais, supra note 27, at 542.
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resulting in, destruction of property or loss of lives.”117 “By contrast,
the firing of a single missile into some unpopulated wilderness as a
mere display of force would likely not be sufficient to trigger Article
51, despite violating Article 2(4).”118 Thus, a victim-state seeking to
use force in self-defense for a cyber attack must prove: (1) the attack
rose to a level analogous to a traditional armed attack by military
forces, and (2) the attack can be attributed to a state.119 U.N. Security
Council Resolutions 1368120 and 1373121 also suggest that attacks by
individual non-state actors can trigger the right to self-defense.122 In
either case, as mentioned in Part III above, attributing a cyber attack
to either a state or an individual non-state actor becomes extremely
difficult when online anonymity and IP tracing may not necessarily
implicate a culprit.123
The Tallinn Manual freely admits “cyber activities that occur
below the ‘use of force’ (as this term is understood in the jus ad
bellum) . . . have not been addressed in any detail.”124 This curious
admission ignores the indefinite line CNAs and CNDs straddle
between forceful and non-forceful coercion.125 Specifically, because
current manifestations of cyber attacks—such as DDoS disruptions,
tracking malware, website defacement, etc.—can be non-destructive,
such attacks would not rise to the level of a use of force under the jus
ad bellum.126 Cyber attacks’ effects could greatly vary as they
become more sophisticated, with potential results ranging from
minor disruptions (website inoperability) to more debilitating or even
117. Id. at 543.
118. Id.
119. Shackelford, supra note 5, at 230–31. See Part II, supra, for a discussion on the
difficulties of attributing cyber attacks to states.
120. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
121. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
122. See S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 120 (condemning the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks that took place in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania, and recognizing the
inherent right of self-defense); S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 121 (reaffirming the recognition of the
inherent right of self-defense in response to terrorist acts such as that of September 11, 2001).
123. A state’s infrastructure may be used unknowingly by private “hacktivists” because IP
routing is ad hoc, unpredictable, and capable of transferring packets through multiple countries to
its destination. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text. Additionally, IP “spoofing” may
fraudulently implicate an innocent state or individual. Id.; see Lotrionte, supra note 13, at 831
(noting “international law has not provided a clear standard for when a victim state may use force
in self-defense against a non-state actor”).
124. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 4.
125. See Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1084, 1114.
126. See Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1127.
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destructive consequences, such as: disabling power generators;
cutting off military command, control, and communication systems;
train derailments; airplane crashes; nuclear reactor meltdowns; or
weapons malfunctions.127 However, to analogize most current CNAs
with kinetic military force as implied by Article 2(4) would expand
the definition far beyond what the drafters intended.128 Because the
drafters excluded economic, ideological, and political coercion from
the definition of force, their intent to focus on military instruments is
evident.129 Even in the unlikely event a cyber attack does meet the
use-of-force definition, another question arises: whether the use of
force rises to the level of an armed attack, thereby triggering a state’s
right to forcefully respond in self-defense to end the ongoing
violation.130
A tangential problem arises when a CNA that appears facially
non-destructive indirectly leads to loss of life or property.131 Though
rare, these types of CNAs would qualify as uses of force because
they are analogous to traditional military coercion that lead to loss of
life or property, but the same cannot be said when the CNA’s effects
are equivocally economic and military coercion.132 In any case,
several states have adopted the view that “cyber force is a type of
armed force,”133 accepting the premise that cyber operations can
function on the same plane as traditional military force and thus falls
under the purview of the jus ad bellum.134
The need to make sense of this categorical quagmire and
identify what cyber activities qualify as uses of force and armed
127. Roscini, supra note 6, at 87–88.
128. Gervais, supra note 27, at 537.
129. Id.
130. For example, in the case of the 2007 Estonia attacks, to date no international consensus
exists as to whether the Estonian government’s options for retaliation would have been traditional
military force, cyber attacks in-kind, or other non-violent measures such as reparations.
Shackelford, supra note 5, at 196.
131. Gervais, supra note 28, at 543.
132. Compare id. at 537 (noting that cyber weapons can have versatile and innumerable
effects that complicate categorization, but to treat “all forms of cyber attack as a use of force
would require an implausibly broad reading of Article 2(4) that includes non-physical damage”),
with Roscini, supra note 6, at 107–08 (analogizing that “if the Stock Exchange or other financial
institutions were to be bombed . . . this would certainly be considered a use of armed force, and
not economic coercion, even though the economic consequences of the action would by far
outweigh the physical damage . . . one cannot see why the same conclusion should not apply
when the Stock Exchange . . . is shut down by a cyber attack”).
133. Roscini, supra note 6, at 108. The United States is among such states. Id. at 108–09.
134. See id. at 107–09.
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attacks has led to the development of several analytical approaches:
(1) an instrument-based approach, (2) a target-based approach, and
(3) an effects-based approach.135 The Tallinn Manual specifically
references the effects-based approach,136 but all three are rife with
their own idiosyncratic flaws.
A. The Instrument-Based Approach
The instrument-based approach looks at the mode of attack and
whether the weapon used possesses “physical characteristics
traditionally associated with military coercion.”137 Thus, “The more
analogous a new weapon is to conventional forms of military force,
the more likely its operation will constitute a ‘use of force’ or ‘armed
attack.’”138 This approach is derived from a textualist reading of the
U.N. Charter.139 “The Charter uses the terms ‘use force,’ ‘armed
force,’ and ‘armed forces’ interchangeably,” specifying that “armed
force is action by air, sea, or land forces,” which includes
“demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land
forces” but does not include “complete or partial interruption of
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic
relations.”140
Under this reading, it would appear the Charter’s drafters
understood that force meant traditional military armed force and
excluded other forms of coercion.141 This view is strengthened by the
U.N. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, which includes
armed invasions, port blockades, bombardments, and armed
violations of territory.142 Each of these examples involves physical
force and violations of territoriality.143 By this definition then, cyber
attacks are not capable of rising to the levels of uses of force or
armed attacks because computer code is neither a physical nor a

135. Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1117.
136. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 45.
137. Hollis, supra note 4, at 1041.
138. Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1117.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1118 (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. Id.
142. Id.; Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 29/3314, art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/RESRes/29/3314
(Dec. 14, 1974).
143. Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1118.
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conventional military force.144 By narrowly restricting the definition
of force, the instrument-based approach is rigid and inflexible,
requiring that new, unconventional forms of attack be dealt with
through new international agreement, which may take decades to
accomplish.145
To illustrate the instrument-based approach’s shortcomings, the
DDoS attacks upon Estonia in 2007 and the use of the Stuxnet worm
on Iran’s nuclear facility in 2010 would not be considered uses of
force, despite having inflicted widespread disruption, because they
were not accomplished using conventional kinetic weaponry.146 Even
cyber attacks that result in tangible physical destruction would be
outside the purview of the jus ad bellum under this approach.147
Given the ubiquitous nature of cyberspace and its critical position in
modern society, this narrow approach swiftly loses any usefulness
and relevance.
B. The Target-Based Approach
The target-based approach takes the opposite tack: it looks at the
object of attack, and “automatically treats any cyber attack against
critical . . . infrastructure as an armed attack because of the potential
for severe consequences if such [infrastructure were] disabled.”148
Under this approach, emphasis is put on the status of the target, with
“critical infrastructure” given privileged significance.149 If an attack
is made on critical infrastructure, it would trigger a state’s right to
self-defense, regardless of whether it comports with traditional
military force.150
The problem with the target-based approach, however, is that
each state individually defines what constitutes its critical
infrastructure.151 The United States, for example, designates sixteen
sectors as critical infrastructure, including “food and agriculture,
banking and finance, commercial facilities, communications,
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1119.
147. See id. at 1118. Cyber attacks are neither physical, nor conventional military weapons
and “[t]he instrument-based view differentiates based on the nature of the assault, regardless of
the consequences.” Id.
148. Id. at 1117, 1119 (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 1119.
150. Id. at 1120.
151. Id. at 1119.
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healthcare, and transportation” facilities.152 While this approach
takes into consideration a CNA’s potential for non-physical
disruption of national security, it is extremely broad.153 Under this
approach, nearly any cyber attack other than one targeting an
individual personal computer would qualify as an armed attack.154 If
states can designate almost anything as critical infrastructure, the
significance of the threshold between a use of force and an armed
attack is obliterated.155 Any cyber attack upon critical infrastructure,
no matter how innocuous, would trigger a victim-state’s right to
self-defense, likely increasing the number of forceful exchanges
between states.156
Moreover, such a broad approach incorrectly assumes that every
invasion of a critical infrastructure demonstrates hostile intent to
attack.157 As previously mentioned, computer network exploitations
(CNEs) are presumed lawful and do not demonstrate an intent to
inflict damage, but are simply intelligence-gathering techniques.158
Yet under a target-based approach, they would be considered armed
attacks if perpetrated against a critical infrastructure.159 Again, this
approach may lead far too many states to invoke otherwise
unreasonable Article 51 self-defense reprisals for cyber attacks with
effects that clearly do not warrant such a response.160
For example, the cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007, despite
having resulted in no physical damage, injury, or death, would be
considered an armed attack under this rubric.161 As a result, Estonia
would have been entitled to forceful self-defense measures in
retaliation for rendering newspaper and other websites temporarily

152. Id. at 1119–20; Presidential Policy Directive 21: Critical Infrastructure, Security and
Resilience, THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office
/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil.
153. Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1120.
154. Id. at 1121.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. Id..
158. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
159. See Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1121. Under this approach, even cyber attacks designed
for data-mining and information theft (espionage) could justify anticipatory self-defense. Id.
160. See id. (noting that any cyber attack, regardless of benignity, would permit responsive
force); Gervais, supra note 27, at 541 (“[A target-based approach] raises the possibility of
wrongly escalating force in response to a low-level cyber attack.”).
161. Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1121.
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inoperable.162 The Syrian Electronic Army’s benign attacks on
Twitter, Skype, The New York Times, and CNN in 2013 would have
also justified the United States in exercising self-defense
measures.163 Whether retaliatory measures would be strictly limited
to CNAs or would also allow traditional military force is unclear, but
in the event of the latter, such disproportionality between attack and
response could trigger international repercussions.164 Under the
target-based approach, the Stuxnet virus that temporarily shut down
Iran’s nuclear facility may have constituted an armed attack,
permitting Iran to use forceful counter-measures against both the
United States and Israel, which would likely have escalated
already-simmering tensions into full-scale war.165 Despite its ability
to accommodate the unorthodox attributes of cyber operations, the
target-based approach would likely foster far more trouble than it
prevents.
C. The Effects-Based Approach
Finally, the effects-based approach analyzes the consequences of
an attack to determine whether it rises to the level of a use of force or
armed attack.166 The Tallinn Manual uses the “scale and effects” test
as promulgated in Nicaragua.167 This approach involves analogizing
the effects of a cyber attack with the effects of a conventional
weapons attack, filtering out “the most grave forms of the use of
force . . . from other less grave forms.”168 Therefore, a cyber attack
that produces physical destruction similar to that produced by a
kinetic attack is more likely to qualify as an armed attack, while one
that produces political or economic coercion will not (in accordance
with U.N. Charter policy).169 However, Nicaragua did not specify
the factors used to make such a determination.170 Furthermore, the
162. See id.
163. Christine Haughney & Nicole Perlroth, Times Site Is Disrupted in Attack by Hackers,
N.Y. TIMES, August 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/28/business/media/hackingattack-is-suspected-on-times-web-site.html; Nicole Perlroth, Hunting for Syrian Hackers’ Chain
of Command, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/18/technology
/financial-times-site-is-hacked.html?pagewanted=all.
164. See Gervais, supra note 27, at 541.
165. See Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1121.
166. Id. at 1121–22.
167. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 55.
168. Nicaragua, supra note 75, para. 191.
169. Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1122.
170. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 55.
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ICJ does not have binding authority on any parties other than the
parties involved in the particular case adjudicated.171 As a result, the
“scale and effects” test is not necessarily the mandated test for
categorizing uses of force and armed attacks, but in the context of
cyber attacks it has become the most widely accepted.172
Michael Schmitt, editor of the Tallinn Manual, developed the
most prominent effects-based approach consisting of six factors:
(1) severity, (2) immediacy, (3) directness, (4) invasiveness, (5)
measurability, and (6) presumptive legitimacy.173 Under these
criteria, the stronger the first five factors are, the more likely a cyber
attack would be deemed a use of force; however, the stronger the
sixth factor is, the less likely it is to be a use of force.174 Although the
effects-based approach carves a middle ground between the rigid
instrument-based approach and the overbroad target-based approach,
this particular test allows almost any cyber attack to be argued on the
side of force.175 Little clarification of the weight afforded each factor
is provided, other than Schmitt himself citing severity as the most
significant.176
In addition, such analysis may lead to contradictory
interpretations of the same event. A CNA against a state lacking
effective cybersecurity may cause enough damage to rise to the level
of an armed attack, yet the same CNA against another state with
robust cybersecurity might not.177 Such a subjective approach may
prove to be an impractical method to place cyber attacks on the same
plane as conventional weaponry. On the other hand, a state with
adequate cybersecurity may have little need to resort to self-defense
measures afforded under Article 51 if a CNA proves ineffective or
even goes unnoticed. A state vulnerable to cyber attacks that suffers
legitimate harm, though, may rely heavily on Article 51, which may
be its only practical deterrent to being victimized.
171. See Frequently Asked Questions, INT’L CT. JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org
/information/index.php?p1=7&p2=2#6 (last visited Jan. 31, 2014).
172. Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1122.
173. Id. at 1122–23 (citing Michael Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force
in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885,
914–15 (1999)).
174. Id. at 1123. The sixth factor, presumptive legitimacy, hinges on whether it is a
permissible form of coercion or not (e.g., economic versus military). Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1124.
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The Tallinn Manual notes that in some cases, the distinction is
clear:
any use of force that injures or kills persons or damages or
destroys property would satisfy the scale and effects
requirement. . . . [A]lso . . . acts of cyber intelligence
gathering and cyber theft, as well as cyber operations that
involve brief or periodic interruption of non-essential cyber
services, do not qualify as armed attacks.178
Yet, the Tallinn experts concede that “the law is unclear as to the
precise point at which the extent of death, injury, damage,
destruction, or suffering caused by a cyber operation fails to qualify
as an armed attack.”179 Murkier still is the case of a cyber attack that
does not result in direct physical injury, death, damage, or
destruction, yet nonetheless has overwhelming negative effects, such
as the crashing of a stock exchange.180 Normally, such non-violent
coercion would not be considered an armed attack.181 Given current
large-scale dependence on the Internet, however, such a crash could
have a crippling effect on essential functions on which our society
and government depend.182
The Tallinn experts also admit that under the effects-based
rubric to date, “no international cyber incidents have . . . been
unambiguously and publicly characterized by the international
community as reaching the threshold of an armed attack.”183 Among
the cyber events in Estonia (2007), Georgia (2008), and Iran (2010),
only the Iranian Stuxnet incident presents a close call because it
resulted in physical damage that rendered 1,000 of 5,000 centrifuges
temporarily inoperable.184 Yet there is no international consensus
that even the Stuxnet event constituted an armed attack.185
Ultimately, this reality points less to the inadequacy of the
effects-based approach as a mode of analysis, and more to the
likelihood that “cyberwarfare” is a misnomer and that characteristics

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 55.
Id. at 56.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 57.
Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1098 n.132.
See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 57.
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of CNAs and CNDs may place them outside the bounds of the jus ad
bellum.
V. CYBER ATTACKS AND COMPLIANCE
UNDER THE JUS IN BELLO
The jus in bello (or LOAC) regulates the conduct of hostilities
during an armed conflict.186 Formed through a long-standing history
of international treaties and CIL, the LOAC articulates the rules
states rely on to determine whether their forceful conduct is
lawful.187 Central to the LOAC are the principles of distinction and
proportionality and the law of neutrality.188 In the context of
cyberspace, questions arise concerning the proper means and
methods of deploying CNAs so as to be in compliance with the
LOAC’s fundamental principles.189 Part A of this section evaluates
three sub-issues pertaining to the principle of distinction and
proportionality: (1) how cyber combatants can distinguish their
combatant status, (2) how combatants can distinguish between
civilian and military objectives in cyberspace, and (3) whether cyber
attacks are indiscriminate. Finally, Part B analyzes whether the
architecture of cyberspace renders neutrality compliance unfeasible.
A. Whether Cyber Attacks Comply with the Principles
of Distinction and Proportionality
A foundational principle of the LOAC is the principle of
distinction, which requires attackers to “distinguish between the
civilian population and combatants, and between civilian objects and
military objectives” at all times.190 This ensures that “the civilian
population and individual citizens shall enjoy general protection
against dangers arising from military operations”191 without being
made “the object of attack.”192 Even so, some civilian casualties are
permissible as collateral damage during a military operation if the
attacker made reasonable efforts to balance other foundational
186. Nguyen, supra note 99, at 1083 n.22 (citing Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The
Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 49, 52
(1994)).
187. Gervais, supra note 27, at 535.
188. Id. at 563.
189. Id. at 549.
190. Additional Protocol I, supra note 17, art. 48.
191. Id. art. 51.
192. Id.
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principles of military necessity and humanity.193 Such allowance for
collateral damage lies at the heart of the principle of
proportionality.194 Inadvertent or incidental civilian casualties and
damages that are not excessive in relation to the anticipated military
advantage are lawful.195 However, should a planned attack be
expected to result in excessive civilian casualties or damage,
commanders are required to cancel, suspend, or re-plan the attack.196
Conducting attacks in cyberspace makes complying with the
principles of distinction and proportionality problematic.197 The line
between military and civilian targets in a cyber attack can be blurred
and difficult to discern.198 This is because cyberspace relies heavily
on private civilian infrastructure.199 Cyberinfrastructure is “spread
and networked across the entire planet,” making civilian and military
cyberinfrastructure tightly interconnected.200
Accordingly, several issues need to be analyzed to determine
whether cyber attacks comply with the principles of distinction and
proportionality including: (1) whether cyber combatants properly
distinguish themselves as military combatants, (2) whether cyber
combatants properly distinguish between military and cyber
objectives, and (3) whether cyber attacks are indiscriminate.
1. Distinguishing Cyber Combatant Status
The LOAC gives only lawful combatants the legal right to
participate directly in hostilities.201 Lawful combatants receive
immunity from prosecution for acts that might otherwise incur
criminal liability under domestic law, such as the right to kill enemy
forces or attack military objectives.202 Typically, uniformed members
193. Established by CIL, military necessity is the principle that permits states engaged in
armed conflict to use only the degree of force, not otherwise prohibited by the LOAC, required to
achieve the legitimate purpose of the conflict. Id. art. 51. The principle of humanity forbids the
infliction of suffering, injury, or destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment of
legitimate military purposes. Id. art. 35.
194. See Gervais, supra note 27, at 569.
195. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 17, art. 51.
196. See id.
197. Gervais, supra note 27, at 565.
198. Id.
199. MELZER, supra note 9, at 30.
200. Id.
201. Additional Protocol I, supra note 17, art. 43.2.
202. Davis Brown, A Proposal for an International Convention to Regulate the Use of
Information Systems in Armed Conflict, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 179, 190 (2006).
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of the military are considered lawful combatants, so long as: (1) they
are commanded by a person responsible for subordinates; (2) they
wear a fixed emblem recognizable at a distance; (3) they carry their
arms openly; and (4) they conduct their operations in accordance
with the laws and customs of war.203 In this way, military combatants
are required to “distinguish themselves from the civilian population
while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation
preparatory to an attack.”204 Because this requirement is typically
met by wearing military uniforms and openly carrying weapons,
compliance may not be readily discernible in cyberspace: combatants
can launch cyber attacks unobserved, and the weaponized nature of
data transmissions can go undetected.205
The Tallinn Manual correctly states that if cyber operations are
to be treated as warfare, then combatants engaged in cyber
operations should not be exempt from displaying their combatant
status.206 The Tallinn experts also noted that CIL offers no definitive
exceptions to this rule, regardless of circumstances.207 However,
some Tallinn experts did express support for a possible exception
under CIL, namely that the requirement only applies where failure to
wear a fixed distinctive sign would reasonably prevent an attacker
from distinguishing between civilians and combatants.208 Under such
an exception, the requirement should only apply in circumstances
where civilian and military persons and facilities co-exist and a
heightened risk of mistaken civilian targeting is present.209 Omitted
from the discussion is whether a cyber attack itself should be marked
to signal military status, similar to the marking of warships or
military aircrafts.210 Military forces are obligated to distinguish
themselves from civilians, and common practice dictates that states

203. Regulations Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277; Annex to Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2295, 205 Consol. T.S. 277.
204. Additional Protocol I, supra note 17, art. 44.3.
205. Id.
206. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 99.
207. Id. Regardless of factors such as “distance from the area of operations or clear separation
from the civilian population,” compliance with this requirement must be met to maintain
combatant status. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See id.
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further distinguish protected persons and sites within their
military.211
The Tallinn Manual narrowly views distinguishing combatant
status as merely requiring uniformed cyber combatants.212 Some
critics argue that requiring cyber combatants to wear uniforms is
inadequate and nonsensical in the cyberspace context.213 But a few
simple alternatives exist to facilitate CNA compliance, such as
creating universally recognized electronic identifiers that signal the
status of persons or facilities that generated the transmission.214 One
straightforward solution might require the usage of a “.mil”
extension for transmissions emanating from networks associated
with the military.215 Although this method may be ripe for abuse, the
same can be said for traditional identifiers like military uniforms (or
the lack thereof).216 Here, the rules governing lawful ruses and
unlawful perfidy will dictate the bounds of covertness that a cyber
combatant may lawfully employ.217
Ruses are permissible strategies under the LOAC, and include
the use of camouflage, decoys, mock operations, and misinformation
to lead an enemy to make tactical mistakes.218 Deception is key to a
ruse’s effectiveness.219 In cyberspace, a ruse may take the form of a
misinformation campaign, implemented by intentionally making
misleading military documents unsecure in a military database.220 In
contrast, perfidy is prohibited by the LOAC and involves “[a]cts
inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he
is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the [LOAC],
with intent to betray that confidence.”221 Common examples of
perfidy include feigning civilian, or other non-combatant status.222
Thus, requiring open display of a “.mil” extension may impinge on a
cyber combatant’s ability to remain covert in its cyber attack,
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Brown, supra note 202, at 196.
TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 99.
Gervais, supra note 27, at 560.
Brown, supra note 202, at 196.
Id.
Id.
Gervais, supra note 27, at 559–60.
Id. (citing Additional Protocol I, supra note 17, art. 37).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 560 (citing Additional Protocol I, supra note 17, art. 37).
Id.
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rendering the cyber attack non-perfidious and in compliance with the
LOAC.223
A more sophisticated method of distinguishing cyber combatant
status may be using an identifying line of code, which may preserve
the ability to employ lawful ruses in cyberspace.224 A cyber
combatant could employ a cyber attack utilizing an otherwise
innocuous extension, such as “.com,” while the source code is
embedded with a line distinguishing the communication as military
in nature.225 Similar to camouflage, the cyber attack can exercise
deception and maintain status as a lawful ruse.226 Covertness does
not necessarily transform an otherwise lawful attack into a violation
of the LOAC, so long as the attack remains on the lawful side of
perfidy.227 The same principles should apply in cyberspace, as the
“[LOAC rules] are designed to regulate the use of force and
moderate its consequences,” thereby maintaining order to war and
ensuring trust that combatants are utilizing the same protocol.228 By
requiring states to comply with simple identifying techniques in their
CNAs, the LOAC would be satisfied,229 cyber combatants would
preserve their combatant immunity,230 and civilians would be able to
discern between weaponized CNAs and normal civilian data
transmissions.231
2. Distinguishing Between Civilian and Military Objectives
Cyberinfrastructure is characterized by a structural reliance upon
civilian infrastructure.232 Consequently, probable targets of a cyber
attack are likely to be “dual-use” objects, sharing both a civilian
purpose and a military purpose during an armed conflict.233 As a
223. See Brown, supra note 202, at 196; Gervais, supra note 27, at 560 (citing Additional
Protocol I, supra note 17, art. 37).
224. Gervais, supra note 27, at 560.
225. See id.
226. Id. at 559 (citing Additional Protocol I, supra note 17, art. 37).
227. Id. at 561.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 560.
230. Brown, supra note 202, at 190.
231. Gervais, supra note 27, at 560.
232. MELZER, supra note 9, at 30.
233. Id.; Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello: Key Issues, 87 U.S.
NAVAL WAR C. INT’L LAW STUD. 89, 96 (2011). A civilian object that serves a military purpose
during an armed conflict becomes a military object eligible for attack. Some traditional examples
of dual-use infrastructure include bridges and power grids. Gervais, supra note 27, at 568.
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result, attackers must take a higher level of precaution in identifying
dual-use objects as potential military objectives, as well as take
reasonably feasible steps to minimize civilian casualty and
damage.234 Complying with the principles of distinction and
proportionality while conducting cyber attacks is complicated by the
fact that civilian cyberinfrastructure may be unpredictably used for
military purposes.235 Such variance would make it difficult to
determine precisely when and where dual-use objects are
contributing to military action, as well as if their destruction would
provide a military advantage.236
Because cyberinfrastructure is composed of dual-use objects, a
wide array of targets may qualify as military objectives.237 For
example, a military’s reliance upon “software and hardware
produced for the civilian population” could make the manufacturers
vulnerable as legitimate “war-supporting military objectives.”238
Further, because cyberspace is now an integral aspect of the U.S.
economy, many financial institutions with cyber presence could be
characterized as “war-sustaining objects” and thus military
objectives.239 Some cyber attacks will easily comply with the
principle of distinction, such as targeting a strictly military air traffic
control system.240 Other attacks will clearly violate the rule, such as
targeting hospitals, museums, or places of worship.241 The difficulty
lies in cases somewhere in the middle, where dual-use facilities are at
play.242
The Tallinn Manual recapitulates existing CIL rules regarding
distinction and proportionality, with the caveat that “determination[s]

234. MELZER, supra note 9, at 30 (citing Additional Protocol I, supra note 17, arts. 57, 58).
Such precautions include choosing military objects with minimal potential for collateral damage
(and conversely, abstaining from disproportionate attacks), attempting to remove civilian
population and objects from the vicinity of military objectives (via warning, evacuation, etc.), and
avoiding military objectives near densely populated areas (where feasible). Additional Protocol I,
supra note 17, arts. 57–58.
235. MELZER, supra note 9, at 30–31.
236. Id.
237. Indeed, 95 percent of all military communications use civilian networks at some stage of
their transfer. Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 852–
53 (2012).
238. Schmitt, supra note 233, at 96–97.
239. Id. at 97.
240. Hathaway et al., supra note 237, at 852.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 852–53.
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of whether an object is a civilian object protected from attack, and
not a military objective, must be made on a case-by-case basis.”243
Interestingly enough, a majority of Tallinn experts agreed that
data should not be considered a military objective.244 However, the
majority of Tallinn experts did acknowledge that a cyber operation
that targets data alone may qualify as an attack if it affects the
functionality of the resident computers or network.245 A minority of
Tallinn experts balked at the delineation, since mere deletion of
“extremely valuable and important civilian datasets would
potentially escape the regulatory reach of the [LOAC].”246 For these
experts, the severity of the harm was paramount, but the majority
characterized this concern as de lege ferenda.247
On the topic of cyberspace’s dual civilian and military nature,
the Tallinn experts recognized that “all dual-use objects and facilities
are military objectives, without qualification;”248 however, they
downplay the extensive ramifications of that statement. The Tallinn
experts acknowledged that “[i]t may be impossible to know over
which part of the network military transmissions . . . will pass,” but
rejected the inevitable conclusion that the entire Internet could be
deemed a military objective in time of war as “so highly unlikely as
to render the possibility purely theoretical.”249 Theoretical or not,
destroying the entire Internet as a military objective is analogous to
destroying an entire array of roads when it is unknown which one the
enemy will take.250 To dismiss that possibility appears shortsighted
given that data packets take unknowable paths through
cyberspace.251 This hypothetical doomsday scenario for the entire
Internet might simply be an inevitable result of transposing LOAC
rules onto cyberspace. Without more specific rules limiting the
targeting of dual-use objects to individual networks or segments of
networks, targeting the Internet as a whole could be plausible should
the military advantage outweigh the civilian harm. However, the
243. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 125.
244. Id. at 127.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. What the law ought to be (de lege ferenda), as opposed to what the law is (de lege
lata). BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
248. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 134.
249. Id. at 135–36.
250. Id. at 135.
251. For a discussion of packet switching, see supra Part II.
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principle of necessity may prove sufficient to appropriately limit
CNAs to the minimum level reasonably calculated to provide a
military advantage.252 Because the Internet is utilized for sensitive
civilian purposes such as emergency response, disaster relief, and
medical diagnosis and records, any damage or loss of life resulting
from disabling the Internet would have to be considered in
determining whether the cyber attack is proportional,253 which might
preclude an “all or nothing” Internet-wide assault.
3. Avoiding the Use of Inherently
Indiscriminate Cyber Attacks
Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited by the LOAC.254 Such
attacks are those not directed at a lawful military objective, cannot be
directed at a lawful military objective, or employ a means that cannot
be controlled such that the nature of the attack would affect military
objectives and civilian objects alike.255 Attacks that are deemed
indiscriminate constitute war crimes.256
In the cyberspace context, the question arises whether cyber
attacks, or at least a subset of them, are per se indiscriminate. Some
types of malware (for example, viruses and worms) that are targeted
at military systems might inadvertently spread from the military
objective to civilian objects.257 The Stuxnet virus, for example,
escaped Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility due to a programming error
and spread across the open Internet,258 leading to infections in
civilian Iran, Indonesia, and India.259 Although such collateral
damage may be controlled or mitigated, it remains unclear how much
damage would be justified in a cyber attack on a dual-use military

252. See supra note 193 and accompanying text; TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 136
(emphasizing that “particular attention must be paid to the requirement to conduct operations in a
manner designed to minimize harm to the civilian population and civilian objects” and that “[a]n
attack on the Internet itself . . . might equally run afoul of the principle of proportionality”).
253. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 136.
254. Additional Protocol I, supra note 17, art. 51.
255. Id.
256. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.
183/9, art. 8.
257. MELZER, supra note 9, at 30.
258. Sanger, supra note 7.
259. W32.Stuxnet, SYMANTEC ENTERPRISE SECURITY RESPONSES, http://www.symantec.com
/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-071400-3123-99 (last visited Nov. 16, 2013).
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objective that serves a significant civilian function.260 Customary
international law indicates that the higher precautions required when
targeting a dual-use object may provide sufficient deterrence against
employing a potentially indiscriminate CNA.261 But because cyber
infrastructure is globally interconnected, a cyber attack that employs
self-propagating means may unpredictably affect civilian objects
regardless of the amount of precaution an attacker employs,
suggesting that certain CNA techniques (for instance, viruses and
worms) should be deemed inherently indiscriminate and thus
prohibited.262 The notion conflates the nature of the CNA with the
way information is transmitted ad hoc across the Internet. Though a
CNA may be carefully crafted, the indeterminable route to a target
may bring the CNA in contact with unknown, vulnerable machines
and access points, making TCP/IP indiscriminate, not necessarily the
CNA itself.263 Unfortunately, states may have to accept that a cyber
attack’s legality is infused with more uncertainty than planned
traditional attacks.264 Such was the conclusion of the Tallinn experts,
who found the uncertainty to be an ordinary consequence not unlike
that which applies to conventional weaponry deemed uncontrollable
or insufficiently precise.265
A related problem is determining the degree of harm to a
civilian object sufficient to violate the principle of distinction.266
Implicit in this inquiry is the question of whether data itself
constitutes an object within the meaning of the LOAC,267 making
increasingly strange the Tallinn experts’ declaration that data should
not be considered a military objective. Any cyber operation, whether
espionage, exploitation, attack, or defense, will involve at least
temporarily deleting or changing data existent on the targeted
system.268 In fact, because most cyber attacks use non-destructive
260. See MELZER, supra note 9, at 30 (contemplating whether a belligerent would be justified
in “incapacitat[ing] a domain name server directing global internet traffic, or [destroying] a major
intercontinental submarine cable, in order to prevent their use for hostile cyber operations if more
than 90% of the data transmitted are of civilian nature”).
261. See id.
262. Gervais, supra note 27, at 570.
263. Id. at 538 (“The weakness of this model is that the effects of cyber attacks may be
indiscriminate and uncontrolled once unleashed.”).
264. Hathaway et al., supra note 237, at 851.
265. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 145–46.
266. MELZER, supra note 9, at 31.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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means, such as DDoS attacks, data manipulation will likely be the
major form of collateral damage observed.269 Excluding data from
eligibility as a military objective seems nonsensical, considering its
deletion or manipulation may prove an exceedingly effective military
advantage.270 An additional inquiry is what degree of unavoidable
civilian harm is sufficient to make a cyber attack disproportionate.271
If the data manipulation is minimal, temporary, or otherwise
unharmful, even a breach onto the open Internet resulting in
widespread collateral damage could be deemed de minimis. Some
data manipulation CNAs, such as DDoS attacks, represent hardly any
risk at all of collateral damage or indiscriminate targeting because
they are not self-propagating and are directed at a specific IP
address.272 However, more harmful cyber attacks that result in great
civilian harm, such as worms or viruses meant to disrupt critical
systems like the electrical grid, may unlawfully violate the principle
of proportionality, despite the object of attack being data instead of a
building or physical structure.273 Thus, it seems plausible that data
can and should be construed as a valid military objective limited by
the same principles of distinction and proportionality applicable to
traditional physical military objectives.
B. Cyber Attacks as Potential Violations
of the Law of Neutrality
During an international armed conflict, a neutral state is
obligated to prevent its territory from being used by belligerents in
the conflict.274 Likewise, the belligerents must respect a neutral
269. See id.
270. The aim of cyber attacks is not always physical destruction of hardware, and thus the
threshold for violating civilian object immunity should also necessarily encompass non-physical
harms. See id. (noting “data should be regarded as an object which may not be directly targeted
unless it fulfills all defining elements of a military objective”). But see Schmitt, supra note 233, at
96 (proposing the characterization of all data as objects “overbroad” and that “the determinative
question is whether the consequences attendant to its destruction involve the requisite level of
harm to protected physical objects or persons”).
271. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 136.
272. See id. at 131–32. (“This method of cyber attack would violate Rule 50 because the
attacker treats the military computers as a single target and by doing so harms the civilian
computers when it was not necessary to do so.”).
273. Cf. Gervais, supra note 27, at 570 (noting that viruses and worms can “quickly spiral out
of control, infiltrating civilian systems and causing damage to property that far surpasses the
intent of the cyber attacker,” and that “the relative inability of a cyber attack to discriminate raises
questions of its lawfulness”).
274. Hague Convention, supra note 19, art. 5.
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state’s territory as “inviolable”275 and refrain from prohibited
conduct within its boundaries.276 This law of neutrality can be
interpreted to include operations in cyberspace.277 A neutral state’s
obligation to enforce its neutrality, then, is triggered by the nature of
the transmission: as a weapon (impermissible) or as a
communication (permissible).278 Data sent via the Internet can take
either form, and the transmission’s true nature may not be discernible
without inspection.279 Impliedly, a neutral state might be required to
actively monitor, intercept, and filter all transmissions that enter its
cyberinfrastructure.280 Longstanding CIL, however, does not require
a neutral state to actively prevent belligerents’ use of “telegraph or
telephone cables or of wireless telegraphy apparatus belonging to it
or to companies or private individuals.”281 Data transmissions cannot
be geographically routed with any accuracy to avoid the use of a
neutral state’s telecommunications infrastructure.282
Neutral states are thus exempted from enforcing a prohibition
against belligerents’ use of “telegraph or telephone cables or of
wireless telegraphy.”283 In the end, the law of neutrality may require
neutral states to prevent belligerents from conducting hostile cyber
attacks from within their territory, but not from passing externally
originating cyber attacks through its publicly accessible
cyberinfrastructure.284
The Tallinn Manual supports the interpretation that a neutral
state does not have an obligation to prevent belligerent use of its
cyberinfrastructure for communications.285 However, the Tallinn
275. Id. art. 1.
276. Such prohibited conduct includes “mov[ing] troops, or convoys of either munitions of
war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power” and “(a) erect[ing] on the territory of a
neutral Power a wireless telegraphy station or other apparatus for the purpose of communicating
with belligerent forces on land or sea; (b) us[ing] any installation of this kind established by them
before the war on the territory of a neutral Power for purely military purposes, and which has not
been opened for the service of public messages.” Id. arts. 2–3.
277. MELZER, supra note 9, at 20.
278. Id.
279. Id. (“From a technical point of view the accurate answer is that, depending on the precise
nature and design of the cyber operation in question, either option can be the case.”).
280. Id.
281. Hague Convention, supra note 19, art. 8.
282. MELZER, supra note 9, at 20.
283. Id. at 5. Data packets are sent ad hoc, meaning routes are unpredictable and not
pre-determined. See BELLIA ET AL., supra note 53, at 18.
284. MELZER, supra note 9, at 20.
285. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 252.
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experts disagreed about whether a state violated the Tallinn Manual
by transmitting a cyber attack across neutral cyberinfrastructure, or
whether a neutral state must prevent passage of a cyber attack across
its cyberinfrastructure.286 The attributes of cyberspace make
compliance with this rule unusually complex. Because CNAs and
CNDs may utilize “zombie computers located in one country to harm
networks in another country—without [the] knowledge of any
individual, much less the government,” two challenges present
themselves.287 First, a country may be unaware that its neutrality is
threatened at all.288 Second, lawful responses to violations of the law
of neutrality depend upon correctly identifying the country of
origin.289 As a result, the impracticability of attribution in cyberspace
may preclude complete neutrality analysis.290
Cyber combatants using “zombie computers” or IP spoofing
may be conducting cyber attacks from within a neutral state, but to
the neutral state the origin of the cyber attacks may look external or
the nature of the transmission may look communicative.291 Thus, the
neutral state may be unaware that its obligation to maintain neutrality
has been triggered, or it may be unable to identify which state it
should direct preventative measures against once known.292 Further
clarification is required, then, of attribution and the law of neutrality
as they relate to cyber attacks to facilitate proper application of the
LOAC. Such development might remove impediments to attribution
and any subsequent LOAC analysis.293
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO THE JUS AD BELLUM AND JUS IN BELLO
WHEN RESPONDING TO CYBER ATTACKS
When a cyber attack cannot accurately be categorized as a use of
force, attribution to a state is impossible, or violations of conducting
hostilities are inconclusive, there are several alternate means by
which a victim state may seek relief or respond. The most practical
include: (1) prosecuting CNAs or CNDs as crimes under domestic
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id. at 252–53.
Hathaway et al., supra note 237, at 856.
Id.
Id.; see also supra Part III.
Hathaway et al., supra note 237, at 856.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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law; (2) seeking reparations for violating the non-interference
principle; and (3) improving domestic cybersecurity. The alternatives
are discussed in order of individual efficacy and relative feasibility.
A. Domestic Prosecution for Cybercrimes
A state may seek to treat cyber attacks as criminal acts, rather
than violations of international law.294 If so, domestic law
enforcement would be the appropriate means to address the attack,
similar to prosecuting domestic criminals “committing fraud and
stealing identities online.”295 In fact, most harmful cyber operations
are acts of cyber crime, such as identity theft and espionage, and
relatively few cyber attacks would truly implicate either the jus ad
bellum or jus in bello.296
The United States has several statutes that criminalize various
cyber activities, including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of
1984297 and the Economic Espionage Act of 1996.298 These laws
criminalize “fraud involving devices, computers, or email; malicious
interference in communication lines, stations, or systems; electronic
communication interception; illicit access to electronic
communications and records; and recording of dialing, routing,
addressing, and signaling information.”299 Despite their breadth,
these domestic laws had been limited by their extraterritorial
inapplicability.300 The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, though,
broadened the ban against access device fraud and computer fraud to
encompass perpetrators outside the jurisdiction of the United
States.301 Expanding the U.S. domestic law that is currently outside
the scope of the PATRIOT Act may enable full prosecution of any
and all cyber attacks targeted against the United States or its
citizens.302 Legislators could amend other statutes bearing on cyber
attacks to expressly include extraterritorial reach, which, if

294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Lotrionte, supra note 13, at 828–29.
Id.
Id. at 838.
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
Id. § 1831.
Hathaway et al., supra note 237, at 874.
See id.
Id. at 874–75.
Id. at 877.
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reciprocated internationally, could increase enforcement and
legitimacy.303
Similarly, the 2001 Council of Europe Convention on
Cybercrime,304 to which the United States became a party in 2006,
represents the first international effort to criminalize various
computer activities.305 The Cybercrime Convention established a
“common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against
cybercrime.”306 The Cybercrime Convention includes offenses
related to illegal access, data interference, and system interference of
computer data and systems, and requires party states to adopt
domestic legislative measures establishing criminal offenses and
penalties for such acts.307 Parties to the Convention must also
cooperate with each other in investigations and proceedings.308 Such
cooperation may also limit parties’ ability to conduct cyber attacks
that contravene the Convention’s intent.309
As of January 2012, thirty countries are parties to the
Cybercrime Convention, while sixteen others are merely
signatories.310 According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, a party to a treaty consents to be bound by all provisions of
the treaty, unless the party makes express reservations to specific
provisions.311 On the other hand, signatories that have not yet ratified
a treaty are not bound by the specific provisions of the treaty, but
they are nevertheless bound not to violate the treaty’s general
objective and purpose.312 Thus, a party state to the Cybercrime
Convention may be deterred from launching a cyber attack against
another party state, knowing that such conduct would trigger
sanctions under the would-be victim state’s domestic laws.313
Signatory states may also be deterred because a cyber attack against
a party state would blatantly defeat the Cybercrime Convention’s
303. Id.
304. Convention on Cybercrime, Council of Europe, E.T.S. No. 185, Nov. 23, 2001 (entered
into force July 1, 2004) [hereinafter Cybercrime Convention].
305. Hathaway et al., supra note 237, at 862–63.
306. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 304, pmbl.
307. Hathaway et al., supra note 237, at 863.
308. Id. at 863–64.
309. Id. at 864.
310. Id. at 863 n.200.
311. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 17, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
312. Id. art. 18.
313. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 304, art. 13.
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general purpose to protect society against cybercrime through
internationally cooperative prosecution.314 Unfortunately, the
deterrent effect on signatories may be rendered toothless by the fact
that there are no clear repercussions for breach of the Convention’s
general purpose.315 Despite such limitations, the Cybercrime
Convention represents the most developed international cybercrime
framework in existence.316 Further, it offers a starting point for
developing a fully comprehensive international cybercrime regime
capable of avoiding the pitfalls of attribution and use of force
categorization that burden the jus ad bellum.317
In contrast to the LOAC, a state may pursue the cybercrime
route because a CNA may not rise to the level of a use of force or is
traced to a private individual(s) whose conduct could not be
attributed to a state.318 Indeed, treating cyber attacks as cybercrime
may prove preferable or even necessary when the attacks are neither
serious nor large enough to merit international attention.319
Therefore, although current international laws may not be sufficient
to effectively counter cyber-attacks, it is certainly possible to use
current domestic criminal law to combat cyber attacks in the United
States.320 Until the international uncertainty surrounding cyber
attacks as acts of war is resolved, it makes sense for the criminal
justice system, not the national defense, to adjudicate alleged
violations.321 Furthermore, treating cyber attacks as domestic crimes
may increase international cooperation, as is required under the
Cybercrime Convention or other extradition laws.322 By contrast,
under the LOAC, neutral states may be hesitant to assist victim states
for fear of violating neutrality principles. Cybercrime prosecution is
also advantageous because domestic laws can be implemented in a
much quicker, more efficient, and effective manner than developing

314. Hathaway et al., supra note 237, at 864.
315. See id.
316. Id.
317. See id.
318. See Leaven & Dodge, supra note 11, at 17.
319. See id.
320. Id.
321. Joshua E. Kastenberg, Non-Intervention and Neutrality in Cyberspace: An Emerging
Principle in the National Practice of International Law, 64 A.F. L. REV. 43, 55 (2009).
322. See, e.g., Cybercrime Convention, supra note 304.
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an international treaty323 and would be applicable to all perpetrators,
not just the treaty parties.
Consequently, prosecuting a CNA as a cybercrime circumvents
the problem of attempting to categorize the attack as a use of force
under the jus ad bellum, only to find the attack attributable to an
individual and not a state.324 A victim state would avoid wasting
effort and resources meticulously studying the CNA, gathering
evidence to support state attribution, and preparing a lawful LOAC
compliant response to the CNA.325 Instead, the effort and resources
could be used to domestically prosecute the individual associated
with the IP address responsible for originating the CNA—a much
easier task than proving state responsibility through the demanding
Nicaragua or Tadic tests.326
The United States has advocated for increased focus on
domestic countermeasures, while discouraging the development of a
cyberwarfare international treaty.327 Treating cyber attacks as
criminal acts recognizes domestic prosecution’s efficacy and begins
to shift the paradigm away from warfare.328 If further domestic
development occurs, such as extending extraterritorial reach to
domestic statutes bearing on cybercrime or the Cybercrime
Convention globally proliferating, “cyberwarfare” might eventually
be confined to the jus in bello, where a CNA’s place as a military
tool is more apparent and the legal issues are less significant and
pervasive than in the jus ad bellum.
B. Reparations for Violations of State Responsibility
and the Principle of Non-Intervention
Despite a cyber attack potentially failing to rise to the level of a
use of force, international law dictates that such an action may still
be unlawful as a violation of state responsibility and the principle of
non-intervention.329 While not explicit in the U.N. Charter, Article
323. Leaven & Dodge, supra note 11, at 17.
324. See id.
325. Id. at 18.
326. See id.
327. Id. at 20.
328. See id. at 21.
329. Lotrionte, supra note 13, at 858; Hathaway et al., supra note 237, at 842; see also
Russell Buchan, Cyber Attacks: Unlawful Uses of Force or Prohibited Interventions?, 17 J.
CONFLICT SECURITY LAW 211 (2012) (arguing that cyber attacks that are coercive in nature will
violate non-intervention principles embedded in international law).
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2(1) impliedly invokes the concept, stating that “[t]he Organization is
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Members.”330 The principle has been affirmed by the ICJ in
Nicaragua331 and is considered an established principle of CIL.332
The prohibition against intervention “is a corollary of every
state’s right to sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence.”333 Prohibited interference constitutes what the ICJ
referred to in Nicaragua as “matters in which each State is permitted,
by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is
the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and
the formulation of foreign policy.”334 Similar to the duty to respect a
state’s neutrality and its territorial sovereignty, the principle of
non-intervention should apply to cyberspace as well.335 Intentionally
intruding into a state’s cyberspace and interfering with a state’s
ability to maintain its sovereignty in the virtual realm could represent
a violation of international law, whether it rises to the level of use of
force or not.336 Establishing a violation of the non-intervention
principle will thus require determining whether the cyber attack was
intended to coerce a policy change upon matters the victim state is
entitled to freely determine.337 To illustrate, the 2007 DDoS attacks
on Estonia were inflicted upon both the private and public sectors,
including websites run by the Prime Minister, his political party, the
office of the President, Parliament, and the State Audit Office, for
approximately three weeks.338 The attacks were partially motivated
by the government’s decision to relocate a monument, a decision that
“remains the free choice of any government.”339 Consequently,
despite the DDoS attacks failing to rise to the level of a use of force
330. U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 1.
331. Nicaragua, supra note 75, ¶ 205.
332. Buchan, supra note 329, at 211.
333. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 428 (Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, eds., 9th
ed. 1992).
334. Nicaragua, supra note 75, ¶ 205.
335. See Buchan, supra note 329, at 211.
336. Id.; see also Kastenberg, supra note 321, at 56–57 (explaining that if a neutral state takes
no action in policing individual cyber-attacks, it loses its cyber-neutral status); Leaven & Dodge,
supra note 11, at 22 (arguing that because “cyberwarfare may be properly categorized as subject
to ‘legislative action’ under the United Nations, the United Nations Security Council may be able
to act affirmatively”).
337. Buchan, supra note 329, at 223, 226.
338. Id. at 225–26.
339. Id. at 218, 226.
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under U.N. Charter Article 2(4), they likely qualified as an unlawful
intervention upon Estonia’s sovereignty.340
Though enforcing such a violation may prove difficult in states
that emphasize an almost unlimited right of free speech, such
enforcement presents a mechanism by which those states whose
sovereignty has been interfered with are entitled to reparations and
non-military counter-measures.341 A non-interference approach
removes one of the major prongs under the jus ad bellum:
categorizing the cyber attack as a use of force or armed attack.342
Assuming state attribution is possible, a victim state can avoid the
frustration and consequences associated with incorrectly defining
ambiguous cyber attacks, such as unlawfully resorting to forceful
self-defense.343 Instead, CNAs might be treated as a basic breach of
CIL, utilizing an existent, simple remedial scheme.344 A victim state
that suffers immense disruption by another state’s CNA, but
otherwise experiences no death, damage, or destruction, similar to
Estonia in 2007, could have an immediately clear basis for seeking
sanctions or reparations.345
C. Greater Investment in Cybersecurity
Although the underlying physical structure of the Internet is
expensive to develop as well as maintain, committing to keeping it
secure may prove more valuable than the time, energy, and resources
needed to pursue international relief from cyber attacks. The global
cyberinfrastructure is necessarily located within numerous sovereign
states that could, though a drastic measure, disconnect their entire
populations from the Internet and prevent foreigners from accessing
Internet resources operated from within those states.346 State
sovereignty grants a state the right to control access to its territory,
which impliedly includes Internet access within its boundaries.347
Clearly, “pulling the plug” on the Internet would likely be a last

340. Id. at 214–15.
341. See id. at 226.
342. See id. at 211–12, 227.
343. See id. at 227.
344. See generally Buchan, supra note 329, at 211 (noting that coercive attacks violate the
non-intervention principle).
345. See id. at 226.
346. Lotrionte, supra note 13, at 844–45.
347. Id. at 845.
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resort against only the most calamitous of cyber attacks.348 In this
case, a state may risk losing exportation and financial transaction
capability, public goodwill, or fragmentation of the Internet along
territorial boundaries.349
Less inimical cybersecurity measures exist for a state to
implement, which could lower cyber threat response time and
mitigate a cyber attack’s damage. Rather than total disconnection, a
state may opt to limit Internet access and actively monitor its content
for potentially malicious threats.350 Nevertheless, in states where the
Internet is perceived as a public good, such Orwellian surveillance
may prove politically controversial and financially detrimental.351 Or
perhaps in an effort to safeguard civilian cyberinfrastructure, state
militaries could take major systems and networks offline and onto
closed-circuit networks.
The United States has commissioned cybersecurity outfits, such
as the United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), to protect
sensitive infrastructures from harmful cyber attacks.352 Established
June 23, 2009, USCYBERCOM seeks “to coordinate Pentagon
efforts in the emerging battlefield of cyberspace and computernetwork security.”353 The mission statement of USCYBERCOM
includes goals to “prepare to, and when directed, conduct fullspectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in
all domains, ensure U.S./Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and
deny the same to our adversaries.”354 However, Lieutenant General
Keith Alexander, director of USCYBERCOM, maintains that “[t]his
is not about efforts to militarize cyberspace, . . . [r]ather it’s about

348. Id. at 846.
349. See id. China, as an example, has the ability to disconnect itself from the global Internet
and operate an internal domestic form of the Internet. Id. The United States has also debated
developing an Internet “kill switch.” Id. (citing Declan McCullagh, Renewed Push to Give
Obama an Internet “Kill Switch”, CBS NEWS (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/news
/renewed-push-to-give-obama-an-internet-kill-switch/).
350. See Lotrionte, supra note 13, at 846–47. “[S]overeign states . . . have the power and legal
authority to establish laws and institutions within their territories to provide for national public
goods—such as Internet access—as well as to take action to ensure the safety and welfare of the
nation and its citizens.” Id. (citing JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE
INTERNET: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD, 65–86 (2006)).
351. See id. at 850.
352. Leaven & Dodge, supra note 11, at 1–2.
353. Id. at 2.
354. Id.
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safeguarding the integrity of our military system.”355 Whether
genuine or not, the comments echo a more effective, practical
approach to dealing with cyber attacks based upon protecting
sensitive networks from CNA effects. Determining the character and
extent of defense measures can be a precarious balancing act.
Lieutenant General Alexander was also the director of the National
Security Agency (NSA) from 2005 to 2014.356 The NSA came under
intense public scrutiny for secret surveillance programs that collected
records, metadata, and other information about telephone calls and
electronic communications—including communications made by
Americans—in the name of national security.357 Once knowledge
leaked of the existence of the surveillance programs, as well as the
secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court responsible for issuing
the judicial warrants approving the surveillance,358 Lieutenant
General Alexander and the NSA faced accusations of rampant
unwarranted government spying.359
Though the NSA surveillance represents an example of overly
zealous cyberdefense, it contains lessons for modifying cyberdefense
policies. In the future, government cyberdefense programs may
prove more effective at balancing state security interests and public
privacy interests if they are made transparent and narrowly tailored
to specific cyber threats and network vulnerabilities, rather than
secret, seemingly indiscriminate bulk surveillance.360 Crafting a
more nuanced strategy that targets actual threats will improve overall
efficacy and instill trust in the public that the government is not
callously discarding notions of online privacy for the sake of
strengthening national cybersecurity.
Overall, shifting the focus away from categorizing cyber attacks
as warfare may also incentivize innovation. This may lead to more
355. Id.
356. David Sanger & Thom Shanker, N.S.A. Director Firmly Defends Surveillance Efforts,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/13/us/nsa-director-gives-firm-and
-broad-defense-of-surveillance-efforts.html?_r=0.
357. Id.
358. Todd Lindeman, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, WASH. POST., June 7,
2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-court/2013
/06/07/4700b382-cfec-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_graphic.html (noting that an astonishing 99.97
percent of surveillance warrant requests—more than 14,000 in total—have been granted in the
court’s 23-year history).
359. Sanger & Shanker, supra note 356.
360. See Hathaway et al., supra note 237, at 876.
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effective means to mitigate DDoS attacks, viruses, worms, and other
common CNAs.361 A possible strategy might be to abandon a
top-down bureaucratic approach to security and move towards a
defense system that requires civilian participation.362 Because
the computers and networks that comprise the Internet are
interconnected, network vulnerabilities are not confined to
high-value targets.363 Any unsecure computer can become the source
of a cyber attack, so cyberdefense should be as all-encompassing as
possible.364 Adopting a cybersecurity strategy that integrates military
and civil defense aspects would allow for more complete elimination
of vulnerabilities.365 Multi-faceted cybersecurity and technological
innovation would allow states to compete against cyber attackers on
a technological front, rather than a warfront. States may accomplish
this shift by “[a]ddressing technical vulnerabilities . . . alongside
effective public-private partnerships and market-based incentives
such as tax breaks for enhancing security.”366 Implementing baseline
norms, requiring that hardware and software developers meet best
practices, and incentivizing public-private partnerships to share
information about cyber threats may diminish the effects of CNAs to
the point where international remedy under the jus ad bellum and jus
in bello is rendered unnecessary.367
VII. CONCLUSION
The effort of the Tallinn Manual and other LOAC experts to
dovetail the expanding use of cyber attacks into the war paradigm
appears premature. The problems of attribution and categorizing
cyber operations under the jus ad bellum, as well as the less
pervasive issues of distinction, proportionality, and neutrality in the
jus in bello, suggest the current manifestations of cyber attacks belie
their inclusion as warfare. That is not to say that cyber attacks will
not at some point be capable of being properly treated as warfare.
361. See id. at 884 (noting the cultivation of research communities able to take on
next-generation cybersecurity challenges is essential).
362. Susan W. Brenner, Cyber-Threats and the Limits of Bureaucratic Control, 14 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 137, 256–57 (2013).
363. Id. at 256.
364. Id.
365. See Scott J. Shackelford, Towards Cyberpeace: Managing Cyber Attacks Through
Polycentric Governance, 62 AM. U.L. REV. 1273, 1364 (2013).
366. Id. at 1355.
367. Id. at 1364.
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However, at this point in history, that reality just has not yet come to
fruition. Cyber attacks as currently understood rarely have
militaristic ends in mind, but rather take the form of espionage,
crime, or political and economic coercion.368
Perhaps “cyberwarfare,” then, is a misnomer, and alternative
frameworks are better suited to deal with the rise in malicious cyber
operations. Instead of utilizing a language of “warfare”
and “attacks,” using terms such as “cyber-interference” or
“cyber-intrusions” should be implemented to reduce the inclination
to treat all CNAs as acts of war. The new terminology would conjure
notions of cybersecurity, criminal prosecution, and international
sovereignty, which are all better suited as remedial schemes than the
jus ad bellum.
The nature of computer and network interference suggests that
alternative regimes are more appropriate to resolve cyber disputes
with potent, comprehensive, and effective frameworks befitting the
characteristics of cyberspace. Though the Tallinn Manual makes
significant headway in integrating “cyberwarfare” into the jus ad
bellum and jus in bello, categorization and attribution issues suggest
excluding cyber operations from their purview.369 Domestic criminal
prosecution, the principle of non-intervention, and expanded
domestic cybersecurity provide faster and more reliable responses to
cyber attacks than remedies under the international laws of war—
without requiring a victim state grasp at elusive categories or
invisible targets.

368. See, e.g., Hollis, supra note 4, at 1024 (noting the Estonia cyber attacks in 2007 were a
response to the Estonian government relocating a Soviet-era war monument).
369. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 5; see supra Parts III, IV.
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